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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
power of the legislature. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 379, 18 L. Ed. 366; In
re Mock, 146 Cal. 378, 80 Pac. 64. Also 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 288. However, all
courts have not recognized the power of the legislature to formulate qualifica-
tions for admission to the bar. Some courts, zealously guarding the constitu-
tional provisions creating the courts, have denied the existence of any power in
the legislature to prescribe prerequisities for the admission to the bar and have
held any attempt to do so an encroachment upon the judicial department and
void. In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232; In re Mosness, 39 Wis. 509. In the latter case
the court passed on a statute which provided for the admission of attorneys of
another state, holding that if the intention was to admit attorneys of another
state to practice, "it was clearly without the power of the legislature.' The
case of Re Applicants, 143 N. C. 1, 55 S. E. 635, is an extreme case, in which it
is apparent that the court has divested itself of what other courts have termed
their "inherent" power to prescribe rules and conditions for admission to the
bar. In that case the applicant's admission to the bar was opposed on the
ground that the applicant was not of good character, and the court held that
insofar as the legislature had prescribed the requirements for admission to the
bar it could not inquire into the character of the applicant since he had com-
plied with the requirements. The statute was held not to violate the constitu-
tional or inherent powers of the courts. No other case is so forceful in uphold-
ing the police power of the legislature in regulating the admission to the bar.
The case of Splane's Petition, 123 Pa. 527, 16 Atl. 481, considered a statute
which provided that one admitted to the bar in one county should on motion be
admitted to all other courts of the state. It was held to be an encroachment
upon the judicial department and void. But the principal case regarded the
decision of this point as mere obiter dictum and hence not binding.
In the principal case, the specific issue was whether a person, having been ad-
mitted to practice in one county, should on motion be admitted to the bar of
another county without first complying with the rules of the court. The dictum
in the case is stronger than the decision, but it is quite apparent that the spirit
of this case is inconsistent with that of Re Applicants, supra. The court said
that there are "certain functions of the lower courts, with which the legislature
cannot interfere, one of them being the power to adopt rules to facilitate the
proper dispatch of the business of such tribunals, instancing regulations relat-
ing to the service of notices and papers. When one who does not intend to es-
tablish an office in a county to whose courts he would be admitted, applies for
such admission, he is not to expect practitioners having established offices within
the county to be subjected to annoyance and inconvenience in the service of
papers upon him."
The court further states, "the adoption of a rule to minimize such annoyance
and inconvenience was within the power of the court, even if the rule in ques-
tion affected the right to be admitted to the bar of such court," and the court
reached this conclusion this notwithstanding a statute which, apparently pro-
vided to the contrary. M. L. M., '29.
CRiMiNA LAw-ENTRAPMENT.-While the defendant was engaged in making
a book on the horse races a police officer in plain clothes placed a bet with him.
Following the receipt of the money defendant was arrested for the statutory
offense of being custodian and depository of a bet placed on a contest of speed
of horses. Held, defendant may not avail himself of the defense of entrapment
where he was engaged in making a book on the races and the officers had not
incited him thereto. State v. Stolberg, 2 S. W. (2d) 618 (Mo., 1928).
Entrapment has been pithily defined as the "seduction or improper inducement
to commit a crime, and not the testing by trap, trickiness, or deceit of one sus-
pected." Undoubtedly the rule is as stated in the principal case, that where an
officer incites a person to commit a crime and lures him on to its consummation
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with the purpose of arresting him there may be no conviction, but that when
"the genesis of the idea, or the real origin of the criminal act springs from the
defendant and not from the officers" the defense does not exist. The difficulty
here, however, as in other fields, arises in the application of these principles.
The question has arisen constantly in prosecutions for the violation of the
liquor laws. It has been uniformly held that in a purchase of intoxicating
liquor made for the purpose of entrapping and prosecuting the seller, when the
seller acted voluntarily and independently of outside influence, there is no de-
fense of entrapment. People v. Christiansen, 220 Mich. 506, 190 N. W. 236;
Bird v. State, 96 Tex. Crim. R. 117, 256 S. W. 277. Where the authorities have
reasonable grounds to suspect the defendants of violation of the law and one of
the officers joined with defendants for the purpose of detecting their crime, there
is no entrapment in the absence of suggestion and inducement by the officer.
Billingsley v. U. S., 274 F. 86.
The fact that an opportunity is furnished or the accused is aided in the com-
mission of the crime in order to secure evidence is no defense. People v. Gard-
ner, 144 N. Y. 119, 30 N. E. 1003; State v. Dregle, 21 Ohio Dec. 557. In People
v. Lanzit, 70 Cal. App. 498, 233 Pac. 1816, the defendant, charged with attempt to
commit murder, acted with and was encouraged by one who was cooperating
with officers. The court held this no defense where the defendant originally
conceived the criminal act and did the overt acts necessary to the completion of
the offense.
The locus of the origin of the criminal design and the fact that an officer had
suggested the commission of the crime are not conclusive of the availability of
the defense of entrapment. The evidence must negative volition and willing
compliance by the defendant in carrying out a criminal purpose of his own.
Ex parte Moore, 233 Pac. 805 (Cal. App.) ; State v. Wong Hip Chung, 74 Mont.
523, 241 Pac. 620.
Where officers of the law incite and lure defendant to the commission of the
crime for the purpose of arresting him there may be no conviction. Sam Yick
v. U. S., 240 F. 60, 13 S. C. C. A. 96. State v. Mantes, 32 Idaho 724, 187 Pac. 268.
Thus in Butts v. U. S., 273 F, 35, 18 A. L. R. 143, the defense of entrapment was
held available where the defendant, charged with the unlawful sale of morphine,
never had been a dealer in the drug, had none, and had never before sold any
nor conceived any intention to do so. He was induced by an acquaintance, who
knew he had become addicted to its use, to procure a quantity from a third
person, the whole transaction being a device of internal revenue agents. In
Shouquette v. State, 219 Pac. 727 (Okl.) it was held that the defense would exist
where a .detective, to entrap others to commit a contemplated robbery, induced
them to join, planned the robbery, and was the chief actor in the forcible taking
of the property which would not have been iaken without such inducement. Nor
may the government prosecute when by its own conduct, through its agents, it
misleads the defendant into believing the act was lawful, Voves v. U. S., 279 F,
191, 161 C. C. A. 227.
In State v. Driscoll, 119 Kan. 473, 239 Pac. 1105, it was held that the fact that
an officer, in order to prosecute the accused, persuaded him to obtain and to sell
liquor to the officer was no defense. In Bauer v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 463,
115 S. E. 514, it was held that initiative on the part of one violating the liquor
laws not being essential to charge him with criminal responsibility, it is no de-
fense -dat the accused was induced to violate such laws for the sole purpose of
prosecuting him. These cases, however, do not represent the general ruling,
with which the principal case is in accord. S. E., '30.
EvmENcE-SnoP Boox Rui.L.-Plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract
by which defendant was to manufacture plaintiff's cloth into shirts. Plaintiff
sued defendant for breach of this contract. Defendant filed a counterclaim, al-
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